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Appellant, Timothy Bosch, by and through his counsel of
record, Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson, and pursuant to Rule
24(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and the Stipulation
of counsel and Order of this Court allowing consolidation, submits
the following Brief.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant
to Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court in that this
is an appeal taken from a final order of the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Timothy R. Hanson, presiding.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented to this Court for review:
1.

Did the trial court err in concluding, as matter of

law, that since defendant was plaintiffs "employer" as that
term is defined by Utah Code § 35-1-42, it was immune from
plaintiff's negligence action pursuant to Utah Code § 35-1-60?
2.

Did the trial court err in concluding, as a matter

of law, that defendant did not waive its § 35-1-60 immunity
as required by Utah Code § 35-1-57 by failing to comply with
the provisions of Utah Code § 35-1-46 which requires all employers to secure worker's compensation benefits for their
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employees by insuring through the Worker's Compensation Fund
of Utah, by insuring through a private carrier or by furnishing
proof of self-insurance?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
This Court's interpretation of the following statutes,
appended to this Brief as Appendix "A", is pertinent to the determination of the issues presented for review:
1.

Utah Code § 35-1-42 (Code-Co 1987-88)

2.

Utah Code § 35-1-46 (Code-Co 1987-88)

3.

Utah Code § 35-1-57 (Code-Co 1987-88)

4.

Utah Code § 35-1-60 (Code-Co 1987-88)

5.

Utah Code § 35-1-62 (Code-Co 1987-88); and

6.

Utah Code § 35-1-107 (Code-Co 1987-88).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case,

This is a tort action brought by the

plaintiff alleging negligence on the part of the defendant for
its failure to provide a safe workplace and safe working conditions.
On December 1, 1981, plaintiff slipped off a steel beam at defendants construction site and fell approximately 2 0 feet to the
ground shattering his legs and feet, crushing his spinal cord and
breaking his jaw.

At the time of his fall, plaintiff was employed

by Thermal Energy Manufacturing Corporation ("TEAM"), a subcontrac-
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tor of the owner and developer of the project, defendant Busch
Development, Inc.
Plaintiff's Complaint seeks damages from the defendant
on the theory that defendant breached its duty to provide a safe
workplace and working conditions for its contractors' employees.
Specifically, plaintiff contends that defendant refused to allow
plaintiff and his co-employees to utilize a hydraulic lift to remove
clamps holding rock facing panels in place because those lifts
were scratching the sidewalk.

As a result, plaintiff and his co-

employees were forced to cross narrow steel beams to remove the
clamps.

On one of his trips across a steel beam to remove the

clamps, plaintiff fell and was critically injured.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

On October 22, 1987, the Honorable

Timothy R. Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, entered an Order granting defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment and denying plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.

The Order was supported by the court's

Memorandum Decision dated September 28, 1987, in which the court
held that defendant was plaintiff's "employer" under the provisions
of the Worker's Compensation Act and that, as an employer, defendant
was immune from tort liability.
In denying plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Court concluded that even though the defendant failed
to comply with the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act
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which require all "employers" to obtain insurance with the Worker's
Compensation Fund of Utah a private carrier, or by furnishing adequate proof of self-insurance, it, nevertheless, was immune from
tort liability.

The Memorandum Decision and Order are appended

to this Brief as Appendices "B" and "C", respectively.
In this appeal, plaintiff does not contend that the court
erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that defendant was plaintiff's "employer" as that term is defined by the Worker's Compensation Act.
C.

Statement of Relevant Facts.

In light of plaintiff's decision

to not seek review of the court's conclusion that defendant was
plaintiff's "employer" as that term is defined by Utah Code § 351-42, only the following facts are material to this Court's determination of this appeal and are supported by Defendant's Memorandum
in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and the Plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment appended hereto as Appendices
"D" and "E", respectively:
1.

TEAM was plaintiff's actual employer (Appendix "D",

1 2) ;
2.

Defendant was the owner and developer of the project

on which plaintiff was injured and TEAM was one of defendants'
subcontractors (Appendix "D", f 1 ) ;
3.

Plaintiff was critically injured on December 1,

1981, when he slipped from a steel beam and fell 20 feet to
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the ground (Plaintiff's Complaint, attached as Appendix "F",
11 5, 6 ) ;
4.

Plaintiff's Complaint alleged negligence against

defendant for failure to provide a safe workplace and safe
working conditions.

These allegations were not at issue in

defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Appendix "F", f 8 ) ;
5.

At the time plaintiff was injured, defendant

did not purchase or maintain worker's compensation coverage for the plaintiff, nor did it provide proof of selfinsurance to the Industrial Commission (Appendix "E",
11).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Point I of this Brief contends that the trial court erred
in concluding, as a matter of law, that defendant, as one of plaintiff's "employers" as that term is defined by Utah Code § 35-142, was immune from tort liability for its negligence.

This argu-

ment is based on the language and history of Section 3 5-1-42 and
Section 3 5-1-62 and the decisions of this Court interpreting those
sections.

This argument is supported by the Brief of Appellant

and Points I and II of the Brief of Utah Chapter AFL-CIO and United
Mine Workers of America, District 22, Amici Curiae, filed in the
companion appeal entitled, Pate vs. Marathon Steel Companyf et
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al., No. 20485, argued December 16, 1987, which plaintiff incorporates by reference.
Point II of this Brief contends that even if defendant
was plaintiff's "employer" pursuant to the definition that terms
in of the Worker's Compensation Act and was, therefore, immune
from suit under § 35-1-60, that immunity was lost when defendant
failed to obtain worker's compensation insurance for the plaintiff or provide adequate proof to the commission of defendant's
financial ability to pay benefits to the plaintiff is he was injured.
ARGUMENT
I
DEFENDANT, WHICH WAS NOT PLAINTIFF'S ACTUAL
EMPLOYER, IS NOT IMMUNE FROM TORT LIABILITY
FOR PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES
It is undisputed in this appeal that defendant was not
plaintiff's actual employer.

Further, since the issue of defen-

dant's negligence was not decided by the trial court, that negligence must be presumed for purposes of this appeal.

Thus, the

issue is whether defendant is immune from tort liability for its
negligence by virtue of Utah Code § 35-1-60 or whether Utah Code
§ 35-1-62 allows tort claims against all persons who are not the
injured employee's actual employer.
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On this issue, plaintiff incorporates by reference and
hereby adopts the arguments set forth in Points I and II of the
Brief of the Utah Chapter of the AFL-CIO and United Mine Workers
of America, District 222, Arnica Curiae,

filed in the companion

appeal, Pate vs. Marathon Steel Company, et al., No. 20485, argued
December 16, 1987.
For the reasons set forth in that Brief, this Court should
hold that Utah Code § 35-1-62 allows claims such as that
brought by the plaintiff against the defendant despite the provisions of Utah Code § 35-1-60 and, consequently, the trial court's
order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant should be
reversed and the case remanded for trial.
II
DEFENDANT WAIVED THE IMMUNITY CONFERRED BY
THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT BY
FAILING TO COMPLY WITH
UTAH CODE § 35-1-46
Utah Code § 35-1-46 provides that:
Employers shall secure the payment of worker's
compensation benefits for their employees: (a)
by insuring, and keeping insured, the payment
of this compensation with the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah, which payments shall commence within 90 days after any final award by
the commission; (b) by insuring, and keeping
insured, the payment of this compensation with
any stock corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of worker's
compensation insurance in this state, which payment shall commence within 90 days after any
final award by the commission; (c) by furnishing
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annually to the commission satisfactory proof
of financial ability to pay direct compensation
in the amount, in the manner, and when due as
provided for in this title . . . .
Utah Code § 35-1-46 (Code-Co 1987-88).

Defendant did none of these

with respect to the plaintiff, its "statutory employee".
Employers who fail to comply with Utah Code § 35-1-46:
Shall not be entitled to the benefits of this
title during the period of non-compliance,
but shall be liable in a civil action to their
employees for damages suffered by reason of
personal injuries arising out of or in the
course of employment caused by the wrongful
act, neglect or default of the employer or
any of the employer's officers, agents or employees . . . .
In such action a defendant
shall not avail himself of any of the following
defenses: the defense of the fellow servant
rule, the defense of assumption of risk, or
the defense of contributory negligence. Proof
of the injury shall constitute prima facia
evidence of negligence on the part of the employer and the burden shall be upon the employer
to show freedom from negligence resulting from
such injury. And such employer shall also be
subject to the provisions of the two sections
next succeeding. In any civil action permitted
under this section against the employer, the
employee shall be entitled to necessary costs
and a reasonable attorney's fees assessed
against the employer.
Utah Code § 35-1-57 (Code-Co 1987-88).
Despite the fact that the trial court concluded that
defendant was plaintiff's "employer" as defined by § 35-1-42 of the
Worker's Compensation Act so that it could enjoy immunity from
tort actions for its negligence, the trial court also concluded
that defendant, although not satisfying the letter of Utah Code
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Ann, § 35-1-46, satisfied the spirit of that section by contracting
with TEAM for TEAM to provide worker's compensation insurance for
the plaintiff.

Appendix "B", p. 5.

According to the trial court,

the purpose and intent of the Worker's Compensation Act is to, among
other things, insure that worker's compensation insurance and benefits are provided to the various individual workers. Id.
The purpose and intent of the Worker's Compensation Act
to insure that worker's compensation insurance is provided, as
identified by the trial court, corresponds with the legislature's
enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42, which defines "employer"
as including persons or entities which are not, in fact, the injured
worker's actual employer.

This conscious inclusion of persons or

entities, not the worker's actual employer, within the definition
of "employer" can only be ascribed to a goal of providing duplicative worker's compensation coverage to fulfill the Act's purpose.
There is simply no other reason why it would be necessary to include
entities, such as the defendant in this case, within the definition
of "employer" other than insuring that duplicative coverage was
obtained or, as will be discussed below, to assure control of the
Industrial Commission over the safety practices and procedures
employed by the those entities, not the worker's actual employer.
There are many reasons why duplicative coverage is necessary to satisfy the goals of the Worker's Compensation Act.

Pri-

marily, by requiring entities, not the worker's actual employer,
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to obtain coverage for the worker avoids the problem of an insolvent
and uninsured subcontractor.

Under that scenario, injured workers

can look to the next level of "employer" for their worker's compensation benefits.

Another scenario could involve the insolvency

of the actual employer's worker's compensation insurance carrier.
If the actual employer were also insolvent, injured workers could
look to the next level of "employer" for coverage.

A third situa-

tion could arise when workers are injured when they are not acting
in the course and scope of their employment with their actual employers.

For example, an employee of an electrical subcontractor

could be asked by the general contractor, a "statutory employer,"
to assist the piping subcontractor in laying pipe.

If the employee

was injured while working for the piping subcontractor, the employee's actual employer's carrier could arguably deny coverage.

Since

the piping subcontractor is neither the injured employee's actual
employer nor statutory employer, the injured employee could then
look to the statutory employer for worker's compensation benefits.
It follows that if the avowed purpose of the broad definition of "employer" to include persons or entities, not the employee's actual employer, is to assure worker's compensation benefits are paid, duplicative coverage is necessary to meet that purpose, and the mere assurance by the "statutory employer" that the
actual employer obtains coverage for the worker is insufficient.
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A construction of § 35-1-46 as requiring duplicative
coverage is supported by other provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act.

Section 35-1-107 creates an Uninsured Employer's Fund

for the purpose of paying injured persons worker's compensation
benefits when "every employer of the claimant who is found to be
individually, jointly, or severally liable becomes or is insolvent,
appoints or has appointed a receiver, or otherwise does not have
sufficient funds, insurance, sureties or other security to cover
worker's compensation liabilities under the Worker's Compensation
Act."

When such a situation arises, all of those employers who

have no insurance are subject to third-party tort claims pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-57, and the Uninsured Employers' Fund is
subrogated to the extent of benefits paid to the rights of the
injured worker.

Furthermore, the injured employee will still re-

ceive worker's, compensation benefits from the Uninsured Employers'
Fund.
It is also important to note that Utah Code Ann. § 3 51-107 contemplates a hierarchy of responsibility among an injured
worker's employers for worker's compensation benefits.

If the

injured worker's actual employer is insolvent or has no insurance,
the injured worker will then seek benefits from the next level
employer and continue up the ladder until benefits are paid.

This

concept strongly militates in favor of plaintiff's argument that
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-46 requires duplicative coverage to insure
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that the purpose of the Act to provide worker's compensation benefits is met.
A second obvious purpose of the Utah Worker's Compensation
Act is to assure safety for workers.
(a)

For example:

Section 3 5-1-12 prohibits employers from con-

structing, occupying or maintaining unsafe places of employment, and knowingly permitting employees to be in unsafe places
of employment, and failing to provide safety devices and safeguards for employees, and failing to obey or follow orders
of the Industrial Commission to adopt and use safe methods
and processes necessary to render the place of employment
safe, and failing or neglecting to do every other thing reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, safety and welfare of those employees.

Employers who fail to comply with

§ 35-1-12 are subjected to a surcharge of 15% on the amount
of compensation paid to the injured employee.
(b)

Section 35-1-15 allows the Industrial Commis-

sioner or any employee of the Industrial Commission to enter
any place of employment to collect facts, statistics or examine
the provisions made for the health, safety and welfare of
the employees.
To construe the provisions of the Worker's Compensation
Act as advocated by the defendant destroys any incentive on the
part of "statutory employers" to comply with the provisions of
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the Act.

After all, if only the actual employer is required to

insure the employees and an employee is injured by reason of the
negligence of a "statutory employer", in violation of § 35-1-12,
the 15% surcharge on compensation paid would be unfair to the actual
employer's worker's compensation insurance carrier.

It would also

be unfair to the actual employer, since its worker's compensation
premiums are based upon the risk assumed.
It should be pointed out, that under defendant's proposed
construction of the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act,
the more control that an owner or general contractor has over a
subcontractor, the more likely that the owner or general contractor
will be deemed a "statutory employer."

Consequently, statutory

employers who direct every action of the subcontractor's employees
and totally control the subcontractor's actions, are encouraged
by defendant's proposed construction of the Act to do so negligently.

After all, if the employee is injured, the element of

control will convert the owner or general contractor into a "statutory employer" which is immune from civil court actions pursuant
to the Act.
Carrying defendant's proposed construction of the Act
further, the "statutory employer" need not even obtain worker's
compensation coverage for the employee.

"Statutory employers"

can then enjoy the best of both worlds.

They exercise absolute

control over the subcontractor's employees to the point where the
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subcontractor cannot question the "statutory employer's" judgment
with respect to safety, they require the subcontractor to obtain
compensation coverage, and they can run roughshod over the job
site negligently directing the subcontractors employees.

If those

employees are injured, the "statutory employer" is absolutely immune
from liability for its negligence.
sical.

This construction is nonsen-

The more control exercised, the more likely the owner or

general contractor will be deemed an immune "statutory employer."
This control negates any control the subcontractor has concerning
the safety of its employees.

Nevertheless, it is the subcontractor

and its worker's compensation insurance carrier who must bear the
financial burden of the "statutory employer's" negligence.
The other side of the coin is similarly nonsensical.
The more control the subcontractor has over the details of the
work performed by its employees, including safety, the less likely
it will be that the owner or general contractor is deemed a "statutory employer."

The owner or general contractor is, therefore,

unable to cloak itself with the mantle of immunity conferred by
§ 35-1-60 and is subject to tort claims based upon unsafe working
conditions in its role as supervisor of the project.
Plaintiff's position is simple:

if an "employer" desires

to be immune from third-party tort liability, that employer should
obtain worker's compensation coverage for the employee, whether
or not that coverage is duplicative.
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Not only does this assure

that benefits will be paid if the employee is injured, but it al£o
enhances the likelihood that the job will be conducted in a safe
manner.
Further, insurance carriers underwrite risks.

Insurance

premiums are paid on the basis of risk, and contracts are awarded
on the ability of the general contractor to obtain worker's compensation coverage. To relieve an owner or general contractor from
the onus of obtaining worker's compensation coverage, is to remove
an important check on that employer's or general contractor's negligence.
In summary, employers who maintain unsafe workplaces
would not be subject to common law tort liability, would not be
required to pay premiums for worker's compensation insurance coverage, would not be subject to the 15% surcharge for maintaining an
unsafe workplace, and would be able to control every action of
the subcontractor's employees even if that control was conducted
negligently.
This result was rejected by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Thomas v. Farnsworth Chambers, 286 F.2d 270 (10th Cir.
1960).

In that case, the trial court held that since the principal

contractor would be liable to a subcontractor's injured employees
for worker's compensation if the subcontractor failed to carry
insurance, then the employee who received worker's compensation
benefits could not maintain an action against the principal con-
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tractor for those injuries.

The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial

court and stated as follows:
We know, of course, that the basic purpose of the
so-called "statutory employer" provisions in the Worker's
Compensation Act is to vouchsafe the Act to all employees,
within their definitive provisions, and to that end to
prevent evasive action by all those engaged in business
or enterprise, within their coverage.
Id. at 273.
The Tenth Circuit continued holding that where the principal contractor is not liable for worker's compensation benefits
because the actual employer provided the insurance, the principal
contractor is not exempt from common law liability.

In that regard,

the Court held:
In other words, where the subcontractor has secured
compensation for his employees, a general contractor is
under no statutory liability, and is subject to common
law liability.
286 F.2d at 272 (citations omitted).
In Fonseca v. Pacific Construction, 513 P.2d 156 (Hawaii
1973), the Hawaii Supreme Court refused to allow the general contractor to claim immunity pursuant to the exclusive remedies provision where no worker's compensation obligation had been assumed
by or imposed upon it.

In that regard, the Court stated:

On the facts presented by this case, the necessary
work relationship for third-party immunity is absent
or, put another way, there is no quid pro quo. Under
the statute as we have construed it, the relationship
comes into existence only when a subcontractor fails to
provide benefits.
* * *
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Therefore, the appellees [general contractors] having
given nothing, cannot expect complete immunity.
Id. at 159.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-46 requires all employers to obtain
worker's compensation insurance for their statutory employees or
provide sufficient proof of self-insurance to the Industrial Commission.

Defendant did neither, and yet, despite the provisions

of § 35-1-57 which strips the defendant of the cloak of immunity
for failure to comply with § 35-1-46, claimed immunity in this
case and received it.

The trial court's holding was based upon

what it deemed to be fairness:

since the plaintiff, who was criti-

cally injured because of defendant's negligence, obtained worker's
compensation benefits from his actual employer, TEAM, it would be
unfair to expose the defendant to common law tort liability.

What

is truly unfair and flies in the face of not only public policy but
the policies of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, is to relieve
a "statutory employer" of its express obligations under the Act
and yet confer all of the Act's benefits upon it.
what the trial court did.

That is precisely

Defendant was required to answer to no

one for its negligence, including a worker's insurance compensation
carrier which, presumably, would evaluate defendant's safety record
and employment practices and charge a worker's compensation insurance premium accordingly.

Additionally, by exercising control

over plaintiff's actual employer, TEAM, defendant qualified as a
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"statutory employer" and rendered TEAM impotent when it came to
safety practices.

Nevertheless, it was TEAM and its insurer who

bore the burden of the Worker's Compensation Act.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff submits that "statutory employers" are not
immune from civil liability in accordance with § 35-1-62.

In

addition, even if the defendant was immune as plaintiff's "statutory
employer", defendant had to provide insurance or sufficient proof
of self-insurance pursuant to § 35-1-46 to claim that immunity.
Defendant failed to comply with § 3 5-1-46 and consequently, § 351-57, which strips employers of immunity who fail to comply with
§ 35-1-46, was triggered.

As a result, the trial court erred as

a matter of law, in granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
and denying plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
this Court should reverse.
DATED this

O

day of January, 1988.

iED R. SILVESTER, Esq.
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq.
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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APPENDIX "A-l"

35*1-42. Employers enumerated and defined — Regularly
employed — Independent contractors.
The following constitute employers subject to the provisions of this title:
(1) The state, and each county, city, town, and school district in the
state.
(2) (a) Every person, firm, and corporation, including every public utility, having in service one or more workmen or operatives regularly
employed in the same business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written,
except:
(i) agricultural employers: (A) whose employees are all members of the immediate family of the employer, which employer
has a proprietary interest in the farm, the inclusion of any immediate family member under the provisions of this title being at
the option of the employer; or (B) who employ five or fewer persons other than immediate family members for 40 hours or more
per week per employee for 13 consecutive weeks during any part
of the preceding 12 months; and
(ii) domestic employers who do not employ one employee or
more than one employee at least 40 hours per week.
(b) Employers of agricultural laborers and domestic servants have
the right to come under the terms of this title by complying with the
provisions of this title and the rules of the commission.
(3) As used in this section:
(a) "Regularly" includes all employments in the usual course of the
trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer, whether
continuous throughout the year or for only a portion of the year.
(b) Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or in
part for him by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision
or control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or business
of the employer, the contractor, all persons employed by him, all
subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any of these
subcontractors, are considered employees of the original employer.
(c) Any person, firm, or corporation engaged in the performance of
work as an independent contractor is considered an employer,
(d) "Independent contractor" means any person, association, or corporation engaged in the performance of any work for another who,
while so engaged, is independent of the employer in all that pertains
to the execution of the work, is not subject to the rule or control of the
employer, is engaged only in the performance of a definite job or piece
of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result
in accordance with the employer's design.
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35-1-46. Employers to secure workers9 compensation benefits for employees — Methods — Failure — Notice — Injunction — Violation.
(1) Employers, including counties, cities, towns, and school districts, shall
secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits for their employees:
(a) By insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, which payments
shall commence within 90 days after any final award by the commission;
(b) By insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with any stock corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of workers' compensation insurance in this state, which
payments shall commence within 90 days after any final award by the
commission;
(c) By furnishing annually to the commission satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay direct compensation in the amount, in the manner,
and when due as provided for in this title, which payments shall commence within 90 days after any final award by the commission. In these
cases the commission may in its discretion require the deposit of acceptable security, indemnity, or bond to secure the payment of compensation
liabilities as they are incurred, and may at any time change or modify its
findings of fact herein provided for, if in its judgment this action is necessary or desirable to secure or assure a strict compliance with all the
provisions of law relating to the payment of compensation and the fur
nishing of medical, nurse, and hospital services, medicines, and burial
expenses to injured employees and to the dependents of killed employees.
The commission may in proper cases revoke any employer's privilege as a
self-insurer.
(2) The commission is authorized and empowered to maintain a suit in any
court of the state to enjoin any employer, within the provisions of this act,
from further operation of the employer's business, where the employer has
failed to provide for the payment of benefits in one of the three ways in this
section provided. Upon a showing of failure to so provide, the court shall
enjoin the further operation of the employer's business until the payment of
these benefits has been secured by the employer as required by this section.
The court may enjoin the employer without requiring bond from the commission.
If the commission has reason to believe that an employer of one or more
employees is conducting a business without securing the payment of compensation in one of the three ways provided in this section, the commission may
give such employer five days' written notice by registered mail of such noncompliance and if the employer within said period does not remedy such default, the commission may file suit as in this section above provided and the
court is empowered, ex parte to issue without bond a temporary injunction
restraining the further operation of the employer's business.
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35-1-57. noncompliance—Penalty.—Employers who shall fail to comply
with the provisions of section 35-1-46 shall not be entitled to the benefits of
this title during the period of noncompliance, but shall be liable in a civil
action to their employees for damages suffered by reason of personal injuries arising out of or in the course of employment caused by the wrongful
act, neglect or default of the employer or any of the employer's officers,
agents or employees, and also to the dependents or personal representatives
of such employees where death results from such injuries. In any such action the defendant shall not avail himself of any of the following defenses:
the defense of ih«* fallow-servant rule, the defense of assumption of risk,
or the defense of contributory negligence. Proof of the injury shall constitute prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the employer and
the burden shall be upon the employer to show freedom from negligence resulting in such injury. And such employers shall also be subject to the
provisions of the two sections next succeeding [35-1-58, 35-1-59]. In any
civil action permitted under this section against the employer the employee
shall be entitled to necessary costs and a reasonable attorney fee assessed
against the employer.
History: L. 1917, ch, 100, §68; 0. L.
1917, §3129; B» « "»*3, 424-54; L. 1939,
cH. 51, § 1; a 1943, 42-1-54; L. 1969, CJL 86,
Compiler's Notes.
The 1939 amendment substituted "two
sections next succeeding" for "section next
succeeding" in the fourth sentence.
The 1969 amendment added the fifth
sentence.
Cro89»neferencs*
Pe'low servants, 34-23-1 et seq.
Applicability of section.
The word "employer** is used in this
£xclusivenes8 of remedy.
The provisions of this section with respect to a uonconiplying- employer afford
one of the two exceptions to the exclusive
remedy provision of this title. Otherwise,
a proceeding under the provisions of this
act is the sole remedy of the injured employee. Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash
Laundry, 108 U. 1, 156 P. 2d 885.
Failure to furnish annual statement.
Pact that employer failed to furnish
industrial commission with annual financial statement as proof of financial ability
to pay direct compensation to an injured
employee did not disqualify employer ns
self-insurer under 35-1 -46, and did not
give employee right to maintain civil
action against employer under this section.
Lovato v„ Beatrice Foods, 22 U. (2d) 371,
453 P. 2d 692.
General construction.
This section and 35-1-58 cover the same
elements and arc intended to save to the
employee his common-law civil right of
action againnt. the employer who has failed
to comply. Pfterson v. Sorensen, 91 U.
507, 65 P. 2d 12.
Nothing in Workmen's Compensation
Act permits plaintiff, in action against
employer who did not carry compensation
ieBsmran*f» nml h n d not

nunlifieri a s A *«lf-

.section i encompass only an employer in
a situation where the employment status
is localized in Utah. United Airlines
Transport Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 110
U. 590,175 P. 2d 752.
Election between causes of action.
Where plaintiff, in his amended complaint, set forth three alternative causes
of action, the first two in negligence and
the third under this section and 35-1-46,
it was reversible error for the lower court
at the pretrial hearing to require plaintiff
to make an election between the three
causes contrary to Rule 8 (e) of the Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rosander v. Larscn,
14 U. (2d) 1, 376 P. 2d 146.
iusurer for injury based on employer's
claimed negligence, to recover cither for
negligence not charged or charged but not
proved. Peterson v. Sorensen, 91 U. 507,
65 P. 2d 12.
This section contemplates that proceedings to recover compensation for injuries
shall be brought against the employer. A
workman may not disregard the actual employer and recover against an agency or
person because such agency or person
furnishes the funds for financing the employment undertaking. Buhlcr v. Mnddisou, 105 U. 39, 140 P. 2d 933, 109 U. 245,
166 P. 2d 205, 109 U. 267, 176 P. 2d 118,
168 A. L. IL 177.
Collateral References.
Workmen's Com pen sat ion 0 2 1 1 0 .
101 C.J.S. Workmen's C o m p e n s a t i o n
§917.
Bringing action against employer ns
election or estoppel precluding claim for
compensation, 94 A. L. R. 1430.
Constitutionality of Workmen's Compensation Act giving choice of remedies exclusivelv to cither employer or employee,
6 A . L R . 1562.
Right of employee who has not received
award under Workmen's Compensation Act
to maintain action against physician for
m Ataractics 154 A- Lu R_ 315.
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36-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, agent or employee—Occupational disease excepted,—The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy
against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy against any officer,
agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil liability
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee or to hL»
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal
representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of
any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or
arising out of his employment, and no action at law may be maintained
against an employer or against any officer, agent or employee of the
employer based upon any accident, injury or death of an employee.
Nothing in this section, however, shall prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the industrial commission of Utah for
compensation in those cases within the provisions of the Utah Occupational
Disease Disability Act, as amended.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, §76, 0. I*,
1917, §3132; L. 1921, en. 67, § 1; B. 8.
1933 * 0.1943, 42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52, § 1.

strued to mean an aet done knowingly
and purposely with the direct object ot
injuring another."

Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment rewrote this section, which read: "The right to recover
compensation pursuant to the provisions
of this title for injuries sustained by an
employee, whether resulting in death or
not, shall be the exclusive remedy against
the employer except as in this title otherwise declared; provided, that where the
injury is caused by the employer's willful
misconduct and the act causing such injury is the personal act of the employer
himself, or, if the employer is a partnership, of one of the partners, or if a
corporation, of an elective officer or officers thereof, and such act indicates willful disregard of the life, limb or bodily
safety of employees, such injured employee
or other person damaged may, at his option, either claim compensation unde - this
title or maintain an action at law for
damages. The term 'willful misconduct,'
as employed in this section shall be con-

Croas-Beferencea.
Employment ot children, 34-23-1 et seq.
Utah Occupational Disease Disability
Law, 35-2-1 et seq.
Compulsory.
Utah Workmen's Compensation Act is
compulsory and not elective. Lovato v.
Beatrice Poods, 22 U. (2d) 371, 453 P. 2d
692.
Excluaiveness of remedy.
Under this section when the injury is
caused by the negligent act of the employer, no willful misconduct being claimed,
the injured employee or, when the injury
causes death, his dependents, must be
content to accept the compensation provided by the act. Hailing v. Industrial
Comm., 71 U. 112, 263 P. 78.
Since the enactment of the Workmen's
Compensation Act in 1917, the exclusive
remedy of an employee who is injured in

the course of his employment is the right
to recover the compensation provided for
in the act (35-1-1 et seq.). Murray v.
Wasatch Grading Co., 73 U. 430, 274 P.
940; Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash
Laundry, 108 IT. 1, 156 P. 2d 885.
Employee of railroad was not precluded
from filing claim for c o m p e n s a t i o n by
application filed under Federal Employers'
Liability Act on ground of election since
employee did not have two remedies but
only one; if injury was incurred while he
was engaged in interstate commerce, his
remedy was under Federal E m p l o y e r s '
Liability Act and if not, it was under
state act. Utah Idaho Cent. B. Co. v.
Industrial Comm., 84 U. 364, 35 P. 2d
842, 94 A. L. B. 1423.
This section abrogates employee's common-law right to sue employer for injuries suffered while in course of employment, except where employer is not
subject to this act or common-law remedy
of employee is expressly reserved. Masich
v. United States Smelting, Refining <fe
Mining Co., 113 U. 101, 191 P. 2d 612.
Where minor's employment at time of
his death was not illegal this section rendered remedy under Workmen's Compensation Act exclusive, and wrongful-death
action could not be maintained, even prior
to adoption of 35-1-61. Henrie v. Bocky
Mountain Packing Corp., 113 U. 415, 196
P. 2d 487.
Fanners and domestics.
Farm laborers and domestic servants,
in the event of an accident or injury,
are entitled to pursue their common-law
remedies in an action against the employer because they are excepted from
the act by 35-1-42 and 35-1-43. Murray
v. Strike, 76 U. 118, 287 P. 922.
Joint venture.
Construction company obtained contract
to construct diversion tunnel at dam and
entered into agreement with corporation
by which the two organizations would
unite their efforts to complete such construction and share in profits or losses
from the enterprise. Miner, hired by the
construction company, who was injured
while working on the tunnel and who obtained workmen's compensation benefits,
could not sue corporation for alleged
negligence of corporate employees since
the two companies were regarded as the
employing unit. The employees of both
companies were engaged in the same employment. Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co.,
15 U. (2d) 20, 386 P. 2d 616, distinguished
in 267 Fo Supp. 411.
This section barred suit by workman
against joint venturer which was his em-

ployer for injuries sustained in use of
machine furnished by a second joint venturer, where machine was furnished pursuant to contract creating the joint venture. Hammer v. Gibbons & Beed Co., 29
U. (2d) 415, 510 P. 2d 1104.
Nature and adequacy of act.
The workmen's compensation scheme is
purely statutory, and the act (35-1-1 et
seq.) provides a plain, speedy, and adequate method of review. Woldberg v. Industrial Comm., 74 U. 309, 279 P. 609.
Negligent injury by employee of same
employer.
Where subcontractor was an "employee"
of contractor, other employee of contractor
could not maintain negligence action against subcontractor but must look to
workmen's compensation insurance. Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 U. (2d) 139, 442 P.
2d 31.
Occupational disease.
Administratrix of d e c e a s e d city employee, who died from inhalation of paint
he was ordered to spray on trucks, could
bring an action at law against the employer, since such was not an accidental
injury compensable under this act (35-1-1
et seq.), but was an "occupational disease.79 Young v. Salt Lake City, 97 U.
123, 90 P. 2d 174.
Subcontractor's employee.
Subcontractor's employee could not recover from general contractor in civil action for injuries on theory that subcontractor was his employer and general
contractor was a third person not in the
same employment. Smith ve Alfred Brown
Co., 27 U. (2d) 155, 493 P. 2d 994.
This section does not forbid or render
invalid a clause in a constructon subcontract by which the subcontractor agreed
to indemnify the prime contractor and
save him harmless for all liability arising
out of the injury or death of an employee
of subcontractor, where such clause existed and decedent workman's administratrix sued prime contractor for wrongful death of decedent and recovered;
therefore, decedent's employer is required
to reimburse prime contractor COT )red by
workmen's compensation as proT ded in
such indemnity clause. Titan Steel Corp.
v. Walton, 365 F. 2d 542.
Collateral References.
Workmen's Compensation^»2084.
101 C.J.S. Workmen's C o m p e n s a t i o n
§918.
- Applicability of state compensation act
to injury within admiralty jurisdiction,
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35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of persons other than employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer — Rights of employer or
insurance carrier in cause of action — Maintenance of action — Notice of intention to proceed
against third party — Right to maintain action
not involving employee-employer relationship —
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery.
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other
than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and
the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause »Z action
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal
representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission.
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding.
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of section 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contractors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased
employee at the time of his injury or death.
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as
follows:
(1) The rea& mable • xpense of the action, including attorneys' fees,
shall be paid and chained proportionately against the parties as their
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier
is to be a credi upon a ly fee payable by the injured employee or, in the
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third
party.
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and
attorneys' fees provided for in subsection (1).
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation.
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35-1-107. Uninsured Employers9 Fund — Creation — Liability — Funding — Administration — Subrogation — Insolvent employer — Fund's rights with
wrongful act or neglect — Adjusting claims —
Penalty — Assessment of self-insured employers
— Duty to notify.
(1) There is created an Uninsured Employers' Fund for the purpose of paying and assuring, to persons entitled to workers' compensation benefits when
every employer of the claimant who is found to be individually, jointly, or
severally liable becomes or is insolvent, appoints or has appointed a receivei,
or otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or other security to cover workers' compensation liabilities under this chapter. This fund
succeeds to all monies previously held in the Default Indemnity Fund. If it
becomes necessary to pay benefits, the fund is liable for all obligations of the
employer as set forth in Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35, with the exception of
penalties on those obligations.
(2) Funds for the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall be provided under Subsection 59*9-101(2). The state treasurer is the custodian of the Uninsured
Employers' Fund and the commission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable
costs of administration may be paid from the fund. The commission shall

employ counsel to represent the Uninsured Employers' Fund in all proceedings brought to enforce claims against or on behalf of the fund, and upon the
request of the commission, the attorney general, city attorney, or county attorney of the locality in which any investigation, hearing, or trial under the
provisions of this title is pending, or in which the employee resides or an
employer resides or is doing business, shall aid in the representation of the
fund.
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other benefits paid or payable to
or on behalf of an employee or their dependents from the Uninsured Employers' Fund, the fund, by subrogation, has all the rights, powers, and benefits of the employee or their dependents against the employer failing to make
the compensation payments.
(4) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory successor of an insolvent
employer is bound by settlements of covered claims by the fund. The court
having jurisdiction shall grant all payments made under this section a priority equal to that to which the claimant would have been entitled in the absence of this section against the assets of the insolvent employer. The expenses of the fund in handling claims shall be accotded the same priority as
the liquidator's expenses.
(5) The commission shall periodically file with the receiver, trustee, or liquidator of the insolvent employer or insurance carrier statements of the covered claims paid by the fund and estimates of anticipated claims against the
fund which shall preserve the rights of the fund for claims against the c^sets
of the insolvent employer.
(6) When any injury or death for which compensation ic payable from the
Uninsured Employers' Fund has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another person not in the same employment, the fund has the same rights as
allowed under § 35-1-62.
(7) The fund, subject to approval of the Workers' Compensation Division of
the Industrial Commission, shall discharge its obligations by adjusting its
own claims or by contracting with an adjusting company, risk management
company, insurance company, or other company that has expertise and capabilities in adjusting and paying workers' compensation claims.
(8) For the purpose of maintaining this funH, the commission, upon rendering a decision with respect to any claim for benefits under this chapter, shall
impose a penalty against the uninsured employer of 15% of the value of the
total award in connection with the claim, and shall direct that the additional
penalty be paid into the Uninsured Employers' Fund. Awards may be docketed as other awards under this chapter.
(9) The liability of the stale, the Industrial Commission, and the state treasurer, with respf ct to payment of any compensation benefits, expenses, fees,
or disbursement properly chargeable against the fund, is limited to the assets
in the fund, and they are not otherwise in any way liable for the making of
any payment.
(10) The commission may make reasonable rules for the processing and
payment of claims for compensation from the fund.
(11) In the event it becomes necessary for the Uninsured Employers' Fund
to pay benefits under this section to any employee of an insolvent self-insured
employer, the Uninsured Employers' Fund may assess all other self-insured
employers amounts necessary to pay (a) the obligations of the fund subsequent to an insolvency, (b) the expenses of handling covered claims subse-

quent to an insolvency, (c) the cost of examinations under Subsection (12), and
(d) other expenses authorized by this section. The assessments of each selfinsured employer shall be in the proportion that the manual premium of the
self-insured employer for the preceding calenaai year bears to the manual
premium of all self-insured employers for the preceding calendar year. Each
self-insured employer shall be notified of his assessment not later than 30
days before it is due. No self-insured employer may be assessed in any year an
amount greater than 2% of that self-insured employer's manual premium for
the preceding calendar year. If the maximum assessment does not provide in
any one year an amount sufficient to make all necessary payments from the
fund for one or more insolvent self-insured employers, the unpaid portion
shall be paid as soon as funds become available. All self-insured employers are
liable under this section for a period not to exceed three years after the selfinsured employer's voluntary or involuntary termination of self-insurance
privileges within thij state. This subsection does not apply to claims made
against an insolvent self-insured employer if the insolvency occurred prior to
July 1, 1986.
(12) It is the duty of all self-insured employers to notify the Industrial
Commission of any information indicating that any self-insured employer
may be insolvent or in a financial condition hazardous to its employees or the
public. Upon receipt of that notification and with good cause appearing, the
Industrial Commission may order an examination of that self-insured employer. The cost of the examination shall be assessed against all self-insured
employers as provided in Subsection (11). The ~o«its of the examination shall
be kept confidential.
History: C. 1953, 35-1-107, enacted by L.
1964, ch. 77, § 1; 1986, ch. 211, § 12; 1987,
ch. 2, § 35; 1987, ch. 126, § 4.
Compiler's Notes. — The 1986 amendment,
effective July 1, 1986, in Subsection (1) substituted "Uninsured Employers' Fund" for "Default Indemnity Fund" wherever it appears; inserted "of the claimant who is found to be individually, jointly, or severally liable" before
"becomes" and inserted "or is" after "becomes"
in the first sentence, inserted the second sentence, added "with the exception of penalties
on those obligations" at the end of the last sentence, and made minor word changes; in Subsection (2) added "and 31A-3-20H2)" at the end
of the first sentence, substituted "commission'*
for " lorney general", substituted "employ
counsel" for "appoint a member of his staff,
added "and upon the request of the commission, ne attorney general, city attorney, or
count, attorney of the locality in which any
investigation, hearing, or trial under the provisions of this title is pending, or in which the
employee resides or an employer resides or is
doing business, shall aid in the representation
of the fund," at the end of the fourth sentence,
and made stylistic changes; made stylistic
changes in Subsections (3), (4), (7), and (10); in

the first sentence of Subsection (8) deleted
"from the Default Indemnity Fund" following
"claim," substituted "benefits" for "compensation" following "for", inserted "uninsured" before "employer" and "value of the" before
"total", deleted "made" following "award", inserted "in connection with" following "in", and
inserted "Uninsured Employers'" before
"Fund"; and added Subsections (11) and (12).
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 2, effective February 6, 1987, in Subsection (2) substituted
"Subsections
35-l-68(2)(a)
and
59-9-101(2)" for "Subsections 35-l-68(2)(a) and
31A-3-201".
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 208, effective July 1, 1987, in Subsection (2), in the first
sentence
substitued
"under
Subsection
31A-3-20K2)" for "pursuant to Subsections
35-l-68(2)(a) and 31A-3-20K2)."
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987,
ch. 2, § 331 provides: "This act has retrospective operation to January 1, 1987."
Cited in Cariucci v. Utah State Indus.
Comm'n & Default Indem. Fund, 725 P.2d
1335 (Utah 1986).
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IN THE D I S T R I C T COURT OF THE THIRD J U D I C I A L

DISTRICT

I N AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TIMOTHY R .

BOSCH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO. C-84-5499

vs,
BUSCH DEVELOPMENT,

INC.,

Defendant.

Before the
Judgment,
Judgment.

and

Court
the

is the defendant's Motion

plaintiff's

Motion

for

for

Summary

Partial

Summary

The Motions were briefed and argued at separate times.

At the hearing on the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
depositions

were

published

pursuant

to

request

and

without

objection.

The depositions have been filed in case No. C-84-

4456, which case has been included in the pleadings of this case
in accordance with Judge Wilkinson's Order of June 26, 198 6.

The

parties appeared and argued their respective positions, and the
Court took the matters under advisement to further consider the
issues raised during the course of oral argument, and in the
parties respective Memoranda

of Points and Authorities.

The

Court has now had an opportunity to review the issues raised,
consider the arguments of counsel, both oral and written, and
being otherwise fully advised, enters the following Memorandum
Decision.

BOSCH V. BUSCH DEV.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant claims it is entitled to Summary Judgment on the
basis that it is the statutory employer of the plaintiff, and as
such plaintiff's exclusive remedy with respect to the defendant
are the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act barring the
plaintiff's negligence claim.
Plaintiff asserts that the defendant is not the statutory
eirpr.oyer of the plaintiff, because there is not the requisite
supervision and control, and that the work in question is n^t a
part of the defendant's trade or business.

Plaintiff further

alleges that even if the defendant was the plaintiff's statutory
employer, the amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act in
19 75

removes

the

statutory

employer

from

the

exclusivity

provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Both sides in this controversy have filed extensive briefs
in which the applicable cases and the arguments are clearly
enunciated.

This Court resists the temptation to opine at great

length on what the attorneys in this case have already addressed.
Suffice it to say that the Court finds that the proper legal
position is that espoused by the defendant on the question of
whether or not the 1975 amendment to the Workmen's Compensation
Act took away the defense of exclusive remedy for a statutory
employer.

While

it

is difficult to square with prior Utah

Supreme Court decisions, a fair reading of the majority in the
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case of Hinds v, Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561 (Utah
1978), leaves no other conclusion.
that

if the defendant

Therefore, this Court holds

falls into the status of a "statutory

employer," then the defendants Motion for Summary Judgment must
be granted.
On that issue, the plaintiff argues there are at least two
areas

where

there

are

significant

statutory employer issue.

questions

of

fact

on the

Initially, the plaintiff claims tnat

there are questions of fact on the issue of supervision and
control, and secondly that there are issues of fact remaining for
determination as to whether or not the work being performed was
in the trade or business of the defendant.
At

first

blush,

questions

of

fact

seem

to be

present.

However, upon closer examination in light of the Supreme Court
pronouncements on the subject, no disputed material issue of fact
exists on either the question of supervision

or control, or

whether or not the work is in the trade or business of the
defendant.

The

relationship

supervision

between

the

and

defendant

control
and

aspects

plaintiff,

of

the

and

the

plaintiff's direct employer are set out in paragraph 6 of the
defendant's initial Memoranda, and are properly identified to the
record.
change

Plaintiff's comments and response, in reality, do not
those

incorrect

existing

standard

to

relationships.
evaluate

the

Plaintiff
facts.

See,

applies
Bennett

the
v.

Industrial Comm'n
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of Utah, 726 P.2d

427

(Utah 1986).

It is

without dispute that defendant as general contractor retained
ultimate control of the project.

In fact, in relation to the

plaintiff and the plaintiff's direct employer, the control on
occasion by the defendant was direct to the plaintiff and his
fellow employees.
As indicated earlier, it also appears that as a matter of
law, the nature of the work being performed by the plaintiff and
his co-employees

for his direct

employer was a part

process in the trade or business of the defendant.

of the

The test is

not whether or not the defendant could or could not install
decorative rock panels, but rather the issue is whether or not
the rock panels were part of the overall project of building the
structure in question.

Anything that goes toward the completion

of the overall project, which is defendant's business as general
contractor, is part of the general contractor's business.

See,

Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 493 P.2d 994 (Utah 1972), and Adamson
v. Okland Construction Co., 508 P.2d 805 (Utah 1973).
The defendant has clearly met the two step test to determine
the

existence

of

a

statutory

employer

relationship

to

the

plaintiff.
Based upon the foregoing, defendant is protected from suit
by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, and the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
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PLAINTIFFfS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
the basi^ that if the defendant's claims of status as statutory
employer are correct, then because the defendant did not itself
provide

workmen's

compensation

insurance, defendant

is

still

subject to suit under the provisions of Section 35-1-57 of the
Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended.
In this case the defendant contracted with its subcontractor
and

plaintiff's

direct

employer

for the

direct

provide proper workmen's compensation insurance.

employer

to

The plaintiff's

direct employer, in fact, did that and the plaintiff has received
the benefits of that insurance.

The defendant did not obtain a

separate but duplicative insurance policy to provide the same
insurance coverage.

The defendant as statutory employer may

have been responsible under the provisions of Section 35-1-57,
Utah Code Ann., if the plaintiff's direct employer had failed to
procure workmen's compensation insurance, but that situation does
not exist in the present setting, and that issue is not decided
here.

The purpose and intent of the Workmen's Compensation Act

is to, among other things, insure that workmen's compensation
insurance and benefits are provided to the various individual
workmen.

The defendant by contract with the plaintiff's direct

employer did in fact insure that the plaintiff had workmen's
compensation insurance.

The plaintiff, as far as workmen's
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insurance,

has

MEMORANDUM DECISION

received

everything

that

he

is

entitled to receive, and cannot be heard to say that because the
statutory employer did not purchase duplicative coverage, that
the

plaintiff

may

still

maintain

a

civil

suit

against

the

defendant.
Accordingly,

the

plaintiff's

Motion

for

Partial

Summary

Judgment is denied.
Counsel for the defendant is to prepare an appropriate Order
granting the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and denying
the plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and submit
the same to the Court in accordance with the Local Rules of
Practice for the Court's review and signature.
Dated this

_day of September, 1987.

1^1
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN,THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TIMOTHY R. BOSCH,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
Civil No.

vs.

C84-5499

BUSCH DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
Judge Timothy R. Hanson
Defendant.
Defendant's
hearing

before

the

motion
court

for

on

summary

July

judgment, came

19, 1987.

Defendant

for
was

represented by William W. Barrett and Robert. H. Rees of the
firm

of

the

Kipp

and

Christian,

P.C.

and

plaintiff

was

represented by Fred R. Silvester of the firm of Suitter, Axland,
Armstrong and Hanson.
judgment
28,
of

came

1987.
the

on

for hearing

Plaintiff

firm

of

was

Suitter,

defendant

was

Kipp

Christian,

and

Plaintiff's motion for partial summary

represented

counsel regarding both

P.C.

before

represented
Axland,

the court
by

Fred

Armstrong

on September
R.

and

Silvester
Hanson

and

by Robert H. Rees of the firm of
The court

heard

the

argument

of

defendant's motion for summary judgment

and plaintiff?s motion for partial summary judgment and took
both matters under advisement.
various memoranda

The court has considered the

filed by the parties with respect to both

motions and being fully advised in the premises and good cause
appearing, hereby orders as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's

motion

for partial

summary

judgment

is hereby denied.
2.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby
granted

and

summary

judgment

defendant againsi
DATED This

^IP^ay

of

Octq6er%

1987,

is

entered

for

rr.ttTTFICAT*'. H7 MAILING
,H this $f~
day of September,
MAILED, postage prepaid, this CGL«-F thP Order; to the following:
1987, a true and correct copy of the Order,
Fred R. Silvester

^ ^ , P A x S : ° A P f I B O N O , HANSON
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
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WILLIAM W. BARRETT (#A0229)
ROBERT H- REES (#A04125)
KIPP ANO CHRISTIAN, P.C.

ATTORNCYS rom
600

Defendant

COMMERCIAL C C U » B U I L D I N G

SALT LAKC CITY. UTAH 64111
(601) 321-3773

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TIMOTHY R. BOSCH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C-84-5499
BUSCH DEVELOPMENT, INC.
Judge David B. Dee
Defendant.
Defendant Busch Development, Inc. (Busch) submits this
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On December 1, 1981, Busch was engaged as owner,

developer and general contractor in the construction of Busch
Park, Phase III, a commercial office complex located in Salt
Lake County, Utah.

(Complaint, 1 4; Answer, 11 4; Busch Affida-

vit, 11 3).
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2.

Busch had subcontracted with Thermal Energy Ama]

gama~ted Manufacturing Corporation (TEAM) for the manufacture ar
installation of aggregate rock "crystall panels11 on a buildir
involved in Phase III.

(Sherman depo., p. 7; Exhibit "1" t

Powell depo.).
3.
individuals

Plaintiff

employed

Timothy

by TEAM

R. Bosch was one of severa

to install the panels.

(Bosc

depo., pp. 4, 7, 8; Complaint, 1 3 K
4.

During the course of the Busch Park Phase II

construction project, James Arthur Sherman (Sherman) was employ
ed by Busch as construction superintendent and was engaged full
time as supervisor of the project for Busch.

(Sherman depo., p

4; Yannacone depo., p. 33).
5.

Busch was incorporated

on May 2, 1977 for th

purpose of conducting business as a general contractor as wel
as buying, owning, developing and leasing real property.

Busc

conducts its general contracting business under a license i^sue
by the Department of Business Regulation of the State of Utah
(Busch Affidavit, 11 2).
6.

Sherman,

as Buschfs

representative, engaged i

the following acts of control over TEAM and TEAM'S employees
Sherman was responsible

for the subcontractors in respect t

-2-

virtually

all

facets

(Powell depo., p. 24); Sherman had the

authority

to discharge people from the job if they were not

within the limits of good construction practices (Powell depo.,
p. 24); Sherman

was

Busch's representative

from whom

TEAMfs

employees requested equipment to assist in installing the panels
(Yannacone depo., pp. 18, 26, 33> 54-56); TEAM'S general manager
in charge of the Busch Park job dealt with Sherman with regard
to any problems he had on the project (Yannacone depo., pp. 11
and 26); when the TEAM employees first went to the Busch Park
job site, Sherman took them around the building and directed
them where the panels had to go (Bosch depo., p. 9); Sherman
directed the TEAM employees who had not previously been wearing
hard hats to wear hard hats on the job and, pursuant to that
direction,

TEAM

employees

went

to their own

supervisors and

acquired hard hats (Bosch depo., pp. 31 and 32); the day before
the accident, Sherman directed

the TEAM employees to complete

the north door entrance way and, pursuant to that directive,
TEAM employees were, at the time of the accident, attempting to
do so (Bosch depo., p. 32).
7.

On December 1, 1981, while engaged in his employ-

ment with regard to the Busch Park Phase III project, plaintiff
fell from a beam in the building on the construction site and

-3-

received personal injuries (Complaint, H 3 and 6; Bosch depo.
pp. 32-40).

ARGUMENT
Introduction
Resolution of Buschfs Motion requires consideration o
provisions of Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act.

The Utah Su

preme Court has stated that the Act should be liberally con
strued, regardless of whether the employee is seeking recover
under the Act or is seeking to avoid its exclusive remedy pro
vision.

This principle was stated by the Utah Supreme Court a

follows:
"The general rule, which has been approved
by this court a number of times is that the
act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose of providing protection to employees. It would be quite inconsistent with our ideas of even-handed
justice to apply a liberal interpretation
of the Act in order to assure coverage to
employees, but if it appears that there is
other coverage, to then reverse the policy
and apply a restrictive view to exclude
coverage in order to allow an employee to
sue an employer.
We think the ends of
justice will best be served and the beneficial purposes of the Act will be best
accomplished for employees and employers
alike, if the statute is applied in an
uniform manner, whoever!s rights may be at
stake."
Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 493
P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 1972).
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BUSCH IS PLAINTIFF'S STATUTORY
EMPLOYER. PLAINTIFF'S EXCLUSIVE
REMEDY IS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION.
This case involves a negligence action against the
general contractor/owner

(Busch) by an individual

(plaintiff,

who had been hired by Busch's subcontractor (TEAM).

Pursuant tc

the

"statutory

employer"

provision

(UCA

§ 35-1-42(3)(b)) of

Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act (UCA § 35-1-1 et. seq.), Busct
is plaintiff's statutory employer.

Plaintiff's sole remedy for

injuries received from Busch's alleged negligence, therefore, is
that provided by Workmen's Compensation.
UCA

§ 35-1-60 provides

that the "right

to recover

compensation pursuant to the provisions of [the Workmen's Compensation Act] for injuries sustained by an employee... shall be
the exclusive remedy against the employer...and the liabilities
of the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and
all other civil liability whatsoever..."
tiff's

employer

under

the Workmen's

If Busch is plain-

Compensation

Act, then

plaintiff's exclusive remedy is that provided by the Act.
The section of the act which defines those employers
subject to the Act is UCA § 35-1-42.

That section generally

defines an employer as a person, firm or corporation having in
service one or more workmen or operatives regularly employed in
-5-

the same business.

That

section also contains a "statutoi

employer11 provision which provides as follows:
n

(b) Where any employer procures any work
to be done wholly or in part for him by a
contractor over whose work he retains supervision or control, and this work is a
part or process in the trade or business of
the employer, the contractor, all persons
employed by him, all subcontractors under
him, and all persons employed by any of
these subcontractors, are considered employees of jthe original employer.11
(Emphasis added).
"[This section] is a legislatively created scheme by which cor
ceded non-employees are deliberately brought within the coveraj
of the [Workmenfs Compensation] Act."

Pinter Construction CQE

pany v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305 (Utah 1984) quoting Young v. Eg
vironmental Air Products, 665 P.2d 40, 43 (Ariz. 1983).
This

"statutory

employer"

provision

contemplates

two-fold test to determine whether a contractor and its emplo]
ees are to be regarded as employees of the original employer fc
workmen fs compensation purposes.
trial Commission, 40 P.2d

Utah Fire Clay Co. v. Indus

183, 184 (Utah 1935).

That two-fo!

test asks (1) whether the work is a part or process in the trac
or business of the employer and, (2) whether the employer r<
tains supervision or control over the work of the contractoi
Those two questions will be addressed below in that order.
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1.

PART OR PROCESS IN THE TRADE OR BUSINESS OF EMPLOYER,
In

the

case

of Pinter Construction

Co, v. Frisby,

supra, the Utah Supreme Ccurt outlined the standards by which
the first element of the two-fold test may be evaluated.

The

Court stated as follows:
"The phrase ['part or process in the trade
or business1] includes 'those operations
which entered directly into the successful
performance_ of the commercial function of
the principal employer1 and covers 'all
situations in which the contracted work is
such a part of the constructive employer's
regular business operation as he would
ordinarily accomplish with his own employees.'" Id, at p. 309 (Citations omitted).
As indicated above, Busch's trade or business is that
of a general contractor and includes buying, owning, developing,
and leasing real property.

Busch is licensed by the State of

Utah as a general contractor and was incorporated for the purpose of, among other things, developing real property.
The work Busch hired TEAM to perform was precisely the
type of work which was part of Busch's regular business operation and was such as Busch would ordinarily accomplish with its
own employees.

The work TEAM was performing "entered directly

into the successful performance" of Buschfs commercial function.
Accordingly, the first element of the two-fold test is satisfied.
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2.

SUPERVISION OR CONTROL,
The second element of the two-ford test asks whethe

Busch

retained

dealing with

supervision or control over TEAM.
this

question

have not produced

The case

any

definite

standard by which to determine when the requisite control
present to meet this part of the test.

However, the Utah Si

preme Court case of Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisby, supr;
supports the conclusion that Busch exercised sufficient contrc
over TEAM to satisfy the requirements of the "control11 elemei
of the two-fold test.
In Pinter, Frisby was an employee of a subcontract
who was hired to perform the metal erection portion of a stru<
ture that Pinter, as general contractor, was building.

Frist

fell from a scaffolding while installing setal siding and subs*
quently applied to the Industrial Commission for a hearing 1
determine his entitlement

to workmenfs compensation

benefit*

The Industrial Commission held that Frisby was a statutory ei
ployee of Pinter and was entitled to benefits.

Pinter and tl

State Insurance Fund sought reversal of the Industrial Commi:
sionfs order.
Using the two-fold test, the Court upheld the Indu;
trial

Commissions

benefits to Frisby.

decision

awarding

¥orkmen's

compensati<

As to the control element of the two-fo
-8-

test, the Court found that Pinter retained the requisite supervision or control by directing Frisby to get on with the work
and expressing concern about the deadline for finishing the job,
and also by maintaining some control over the materials used on
the job.

Id, at p. 309.
Similar and even more extensive acts of control were

exercised by Busch over TEAM.

Those acts of control are enumer-

ated in paragraph 6 of the Statement of Facts, above.

The con-

trol exercised by Busch over TEAM was such that the second element of the two-fold test is satisfied.
Both

elements

of

the

two-fold

test

are

satisfied.

Accordingly, Busch is plaintiff's statutory employer and plaintiff's exclusive remedy is that provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendant Busch Development, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.
DATED this l*j V^ day of December, 1986.
KIPP J$V CHRISTIAN,

[LLIAM W. BARRETT
ROBERT H. REES
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
MAILED, postage prepaid, this c^ f
1986,
in

a

true

Support

of

and

correct copy

Defendant's

day of Decembei

of the foregoing Memorandi

Motion

for Summary

Judgment, 1

the following:
Fred R, Silvester
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South -West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
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APPENDIX "E"

FRED R. SILVESTER, Esq. (#3862)
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq. (#4658)
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff Timothy R. Bosch
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TIMOTHY R. BOSCH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BUSCH DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
Defendant.

]|
|
]|
>
]

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

i

Civil No. C 84-5499

]i

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

STATEMENT OF THE MOTION
Defendant Busch Park has previously moved the Court
for summary judgment requesting that it be declared the statutory
employer of the plaintiff, Timothy Bosch•

This Motion is made

for purposes of having the Court declare that if Busch Park is
statutory employer of the plaintiff Bosch, because of its noncompliance with the Worker's Compensation Act, plaintiff is entitled to all the benefits of the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-57.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

-•

1.

Defendant h a d not secured compensation coverage

.*? ' -

r\r ' ;ees pursuant to the provisions

of Utah Code A n n , ..

----

(Powell Deposition,

Exhibit 1, p . 6; Strong Deposition, Exhibit _, ^

-o
*.--i Exhibit

ARGUMENT
In defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, J. t" ?LiiTed
that under t h e provisions of Utah Code A n n . § 35-1-42(2)
q 11 d ], i f i ed

a L• <I I * L a t u t o i , e mp J i j y e i JJe c a j s e

i ti r e t a i ned

it
:

J 11 \

\ e r"/1 s i o in

and control over the work of TEAM Corporation and t h e w o r k done
by TEAM Corporation w a s a part or process i.n the trade or business
of Busch Park.
Should the Court determine that Busch Park w a s in fact
an employer; nnaeA0

rjifr < tei in it ion of r.h^ wor tcer * :«,, < 'n'jirifjf'iisaf' i nn

Act, the employer then is charged with certain duties under the
Act.
1.

T h e employer must secure compensation 1: y :
(a)

Insuring with the State Insurance Fund;

(b)

El;; f :i nsi iri i ig wi tli a pri ^ /"ate stock: cor j >c i- •

ration or a mutual association authorized to transact
the business of w o r k e r f s compensation in the State of
Utah; or by

(c)

By furnishing annually to the Industrial

Commission proof of financial ability to pay direct
compensation.
See Utah Code Ann, § 35-1-46.
In addition, an employer must file with the Industrial
Commission notice of insurance and contractors or policies of
insurance covering the specific employees.

See Utah Code Ann.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-57 as follows:
Employers who shall fail to comply with the
provisions of § 35-1-46 shall not be entitled
to the benefits of this title during the
period of non-compliance, but shall be liable
in a civil action to their employees for
damages suffered by reason of personal injuries arising out of or in the course of
employment caused by the wrongful act, neglect
or default of the employer or any of the
employer's officers, agents or employees,
and also to the dependents or personal representatives of such employees where death
results from such injuries. In such action
the defendant shall not avail himself of
any of the following defenses: the defense
of the fellow servant rule, the defense of
assumption of risk, or the defense of contributory negligence. Proof of the injury
shall constitute prima facie evidence of
negligence on the part of the employer and
the burden shall be upon the employer to
show freedom from negligence resulting in
such injury. And such employer shall also
be subject to the provisions of the two sections next succeeding. In any civil action
permitted under this section against the
employer, the employee shall be entitled to
necessary costs and a reasonable attorney's
fee assessed against the employer.

- 3 -

Because of defendarr

*.:/:..-

I

Summary Judgment that it is a statutory employer
r

] K^r*'

- -

:r
'ne plaintiff,

declaring the p r o -

visions of i 3 5-1-57 applicable ~ <-> *-:< *

* +*Ke ^^se I n this

action and specifically striking any defenses for comparative
fan... wn. the part of the plaintiff

,

u. ent. i L.UM1 I-.

this relief because Busch has failed to comply with the coverage
Utah Code A n n , k 3r:i I • 4 6
DATED
*TED

thJft

/

/v
/

da > o f

Auqu'it ,

I "H"' .

SIR, E s q .
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq.
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Timothy Bosch
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing Memorandum of Poin^* and Authorities.
in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to be mailed,
pujjLayy pgepaid fchegcon, this ^

£
/

day of August,

William W. Barrett, Esq.
Robert H. Rees, Esq.
KIPP and CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-23:

^

(FRS7.16)
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1987, to:

,A •

Fred R. Si
Bar #3862
BLACK & MOORE
261 East Broadway, Suite uiO
Salt Lake City, DT
84111
Telephone:
363-2727
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
l" M.JN" rOK SALT i.-Ah'' COUNTS,
STATE OF UTAH

TIMOTHY

BOSCH,
COMPLAINT

:ivn

BUSCH DEVELOPMENT, INC.,

*«.f?y-4fff
<%* £

y*.

Defendant.

tf-iZT.

action claims ,•
County,,

resident
x u

is

LAIC

i-;*- - *

irpora^i°n

alleges as follows?

nformation

* -

and

Dei:*-*:
c

,oenseu

with- i t s headquarters

Sal

I UU t\U

. ate

tate

v
w ct =.

: iv
„; r.

building

December
T

hermal

cOurr>,n Busch Park

*.*c>*.

Energy
.

ui. Utan

Lake County, ijcait u- Utah.
• ;uv<ii Ln i *• <% a ; - ~

arose occurred

defendant

during

Amalgamaged

at

L

".00 South

defendant Busch Developments
contractor of said Busch Park,

i

. , •" fi;

Manufac*

-, -

•, _,

located

wh

r o .: *: ion

- tue

; ,nu

and

race

of a

~--n West, Salt

Lake

Xnc.lf way the developer

5.

That plaintiff, in the course of placing rock panels

on the face of the building at Busch Parkf while trying to gain
access to the outside of the building on the third floor of the
building across steel girders, did fall and suffer severe personal
injuries as hereinafter alleged.
6.

That as a result of the fall, plaintiff has been caused

personal injuries requiring payment of medical expenses, lost
earnings and earning potential, physical and emotional pain and
suffering.

FIRST, .CAUSE OF ACTION
7.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through

6 above and further alleges as follows:
8.

That defendant Busch Development, Inc., was negligent

in the following particulars:
a.

Failure to provide a safe and adequate workplace

for the employees of independent contractors who are business
invitees on the construction site of Busch Park;
b.

Failure to provide proper ladders, scaffolding,

tools, access routes and safety devices to business invitees
at said Busch Park?
c.

Failure to provide proper guarding, safety belts,

nets or other devices to protect business invitees from falling
or suffering severe personal injury as a result of falls while
conducting their business on the premises;

2

d.

-Fa i J on H l ii

|ni MMJ ni i l f

dilr-Mjihil v

in n n 1mi i i n

i mist r a r t i o r i s

to business invitees regarding the unreasonably dangerous nature
premises of Busch Park during its development phase.
. 9„ That as a direct and proximate resull. of the above iieg 1 igen)
acts by defendant f plaintiff was caused to suffer personal injuries
damage &nd Iu^s, ' , ' ,
a.

Severe crushing, damage, and bruising of the spinal

K

Fractures of both feet;
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Multiple fractures of both legs;
d.

F -,
Severe shock
*rment

. plaintiff's .nervous system and

general health;

severe and extensive loss *ii bodily Junction m*l
disfigurement;
of, and permanent loss of earning capacity i n the future;
h » Medi c a ] , hospi t .a ] and doctor bills which are continuing
and ongoing in nature, the amount of which will be subject to
proof at trial;
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That as a result ot the foregoing, plaintiff has suffered

genera 1 damages for his pain and suffering, both mental and physical,
for his loss of bodily function and disfigurement, for the shock
and injury to hi .s i iervous system
for spec i a 1 d a m a g «

-.;

•n- amount of $l,500,000o00;

i i: I g s a i: I d e a r n i n g

capacity/ hospital/ doctors and medical expenses/ prosthetic
devices in such sums as will be subject to proof at trial.
NOW WHEREFORE plaintiff prays for general damages as alleged
in the sum of $1/500/000*00/ for special damages as shall be
proved at trial/ for interest on his special damages according
to Utah law/ for his costs herein incurred/ and for such other
and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under
the circumstances.
DATED this

_ day of September, 1984.
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